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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the court held that whether the loan was refused the individual or agreed
upon was an issuable question of fact for the jury to determine? 6 This
latter decision of the New Jersey court adopts the rule established in
Jenkins v. Moyse.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the lender can protect
himself by first refusing to make the loan to the individual and then suggest
that, if the borrower will incorporate, a loan will be made to the corpora-
tion. Should the lender agree to make the loan to the individual and then
impose the condition that the borrower incorporate, he may well find him-
self subject to the penalties provided by the usury laws. This hairline
distinction should not be recognized. The courts have repeatedly struck
down various devices employed to avoid the usury laws 7  The Supreme
Court of Florida has said, concerning the usury laws, ". . . we deem it to be
of paramount importance that a statute so salutary in its operation as is the
statute against usury, should be sedulously guarded against the ingenious
shifts and devices so often resorted to to evade its operation."28  To frus-
trate evasions, the courts look beyond the form of transactions to their
substance.2 They will not, however, by "piercing the corporate veil," defeat
the purpose of the statute depriving the corporation of the defense of usury.
However, they cannot escape the fact that blindly closing their eyes to
tainted transactions defeats the very letter and spirit of the usury laws. It
is inconceivable that the law itself has provided unscrupulous money lenders
with a device to successfully avoid the usury statutes. The needy borrower
is no less deprived of his freedom of contracting and is as much at the mercy
of the lender in this instance as in any other. XVhen the problem presents
itself to the courts the transaction should be closely scrutinized. If the
court finds that the loan was to the corporation in form only while in fact
it was to an individual, then it should make no difference in the way the
lender approached the deal. The transaction should be considered as just
another shift or device to avoid the usury statutes and be dealt with accord-
ingly. Reality, not appearance, should determine legal rights.
LEONARD M. RIViICND
COVENANTS FOR TITLE - PROTECTION AFFORDED
BUYER OF REALTY IN FLORIDA
The "Covenants for Title", sometimes referred to as the "Common
Law Covenants for Title", are six in number. They are: 1) The covenant
26. Celber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952)
27. See Evasion and Avoidance of Florida Usury Laws, Comment, 5 M,^Ami LQ.
493 (1951).
28. Belden v. Cray, 5 Fla. 504, 508 (1854).
29. Beachan v. Carr, 166 So. 456 (Fla. 1936). But see Kings Meichantile Co. v.Cooper, 199 Misc. 381; 100 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1950).
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of seisin; 2) The covenant of right to convey; 3) The covenant against in-
cumbrances; 4) The covenant for quiet enjoyment; 5) The covenant of
warranty; and 6) The covenant for further assurances. The first five are
widely used in the United States. The sixth, which is recognized in three
states,' is commonly used in England. There may be some doubt as to the
position Florida will take in the future, but it is safe to say that to date only
the first five covenants have been recognized.
In construing the meaning of these covenants, the several states have
given the word "seisin" two different definitions. Some jurisdictions say that
it means "possession of land by one having or claiming a freehold estate,
either by himself or by another."2 However, the majority rule defines
"seisin" as meaning "that the grantor has the estate, in quantity and quality,
which he purports to convey."'
The covenant of right to convey is self-explanatory, and though it is
said to be "usually equivalent to the covenant for seisin,"'' it may exist
where "there is no seisin or title, as when the conveyance is under a power."
Almost without exception the word "incumbrance" has been defined
as "every right to or interest in the land which may subsist in third persons,
to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing
of the fee by the conveyance."6
Probably the best way to define the covenants of quiet enjoyment and
warranty is to tell what they guard against. Though the effect of the two is
similar, the covenant of quiet enjoyment is designed primarily to guard
against eviction, especially where the covenantee is a lessee; and the covenant
of warranty is given to defend the premises against all lawful claims by
third persons.7
Finally, the covenant for further assurances is a "covenant by the
grantor to make such further assurances as may be necessary to perfect the
title."' Though this covenant is not popular in the United States, the merit
of it lies in the fact that it is the basis of a suit for specific performance.
Florida is apparently in accord with these definitions, and certainly is
in accord with the majority as to the meaning of "seisin"9' and "incum-
brances".10
In the absence of statute none of these covenants are implied, but must
be expressed in the deed of conveyance. Some states go so far as to specifically
1. Mo., N.D., and N.J.
2. TIFFANY, THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 698 (New Abr. Ed. 1940).
3. Id. at 699.
4. Id. at 700.
5. Ibid.
6. Id. at 701.
7. Id. at 704.
8. Id. at 707.
9. Williams v. Azar, 47 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1950); Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544, 141
So. 728 (1932).
10. Gore v. General Properties Corporation, 149 Fla. 690, 6 So.2d 837 (1942).
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provide by statute that there will be no implied covenants for title.'1 How-
ever, most states have statutes permitting the use of a short form warranty
deed, which, if followed, will give effect to certain of the covenants for
title as if they were expressed.' 2 Florida is one of these.13 The majority of the
states having such statutes enumerate the covenants that will be effective
by use of the short form of warranty deed. Florida differs in that the statute
simply provides:
A conveyance executed substantially in the foregoing form
shall be held to be a warranty deed with full common law covenants,
and shall just as effectually bind the grantor, and his heirs, as if
said covenants were specifically set out therein. And this form of
conveyance when signed by a married woman shall be held to
convey whatever interest in the property conveyed which she may
possess. 14
It is because of this general language, i.e., "full common law covenants",
that there may be some doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the
covenant for further assurances in Florida.
Having discussed the covenants and their meanings, and the Florida
statute' s giving effect to them, we will now consider how these covenants
protect the purchaser. Generally, the protection afforded the buyer in the
event of a breach of covenant is a suit in law, either for damages or for the
purchase price. However, a fuller and more specific understanding of the
protection afforded the buyer requires that we know not only the measure
of damages, but what constitutes a breach of any of the covenants, and
how such a breach may possibly be utilized in a suit other than one for
damages. To learn this, let us look at the cases that have been decided in
Florida, starting first with those cases which involved the covenant of
seisin, and then the others.
It has been held that, upon the breach of the covenant of seisin, the
grantee may recover the purchase money paid with interest, and that the
breach occurs upon execution and delivery.' 1 This is not the only remedy.
The grantee may elect to buy the outstanding title, in which case lie can re-
cover the amount paid for it, not to exceed the amount of consideration
for the deed, the cost of suit and attorney's fees.'7 Also, if there is an actual
adverse possessor on the premises, the grantee may sue in ejectment, and
if successful, he will be entitled to taxable costs and reasonable attorney's
fees.'8 It is not necessary that there be a total failure of seisin before an
action for breach can be brought. It is enough that there be a partial failure,
11. E.g., Ariz., Ga., Mich., and Neb,
12. Ala., Ark., Calif., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Mass., Minn., Nev,, Okla., and others.
13. FLA. STAT. § 689.03 (1951).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Williams v. Azar, 47 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1950); Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544,
141 So. 728 (1932).
17. Williams v. Azar, 47 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1950).
18. Ibid.
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such as where a person is in adverse possession of a portion of a lot. In such
a case the measure of damages is the proportionate fractional part of the
whole consideration paid, with interest from the time that the plaintiff was
deprived of the use of that part to which he could not acquire possession. 19
It is important to note that the buyer cannot use breach of the covenant
of seisin as a basis for rescission of the contract of sale or the restoration of
the purchase money.20
This writer could not find any cases on the covenant of right to con-
vey. The reason for this situation probably lies in the fact that its breach
is usually accompanied by a breach of the covenant of seisin. Similarly, there
are no cases which involve the covenant of quiet enjoyment because the
remedy under the covenant of warranty usually is sufficient. Also, the litiga-
tion on the covenant of quiet enjoyment usually involves lease agreements.
There has been a considerable amount of litigation on the covenant
against incumbrances. From this we learn that the right of dower, inchoate
or consummate, is an incumbrance. 2' Also, a right in a third person to enter
upon the land and enjoy the benefit of the oil and asphalt rights therein, 22
and tax liens, subsisting at the time of the conveyance, 23 have been recog-
nized as incumnbrances. On the other hand, the legal existence of a railroad
right of way, when the roadbed and tracks were upon the real estate at the
time of conveyance, was not considered to be a breach of the covenant
against incumbrances.2' Similarly, a public highway and appurtenent drain-
age ditch that encroached upon the land were held not to sustain an action
for breach of the covenant against incumbrances. 25 These last two examples
seem to be in accord with the view that visible easements should be ex-
cepted from the operation of the covenant. 20
The Florida Supreme Court has held that the measure of damages is
the amount paid, or the reasonable and necessary costs incurred in removing
the incumbrances.27 In another case the damages were the amount paid on
tax liens, plus interest thereon.2 8 Another way in which this covenant affords
protection to the buyer is that it may work an estoppel. For example, a
married woman executed a warranty deed jointly with her husband. She
then tried to foreclose on a mortgage held by her prior to the conveyance.
It was held that the woman was estopped from asserting the mortgage, after
having covenanted that there were no incumbrances 0.2
The covenant of warranty is by far the one most frequently relied upon
19. Ibid.
20. Gore v. General Properties Corp., 149 Fla. 696, So.2d 837 (1942).
21. Gore v. General Properties Corp., 149 Fla. 690, 6 So.2d 837 (1942).
22. Flood v. Graham, 61 Fla. 207, 54 So.456 (1911).
23. Cole & Co. v. Whiddon, 77 Fla. 842, 82 So. 297 (1919).
24. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284, 53 So. 381 (1910).
25. Charles 11. Deeb, Inc. v. Kestner, 59 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1952).
26. RAWLE, THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TITLE, 117 (3d ed. 1860).
27. Gore v. General Properties Corp., 149 Fla. 690, 6 So.2d 837 (1942).
28. Cole & Co. v. Whiddon, 77 Fla. 842, 82 So. 297 (1919).
29. Vliet v. Anthony, 121 Fla. 439, 164 So. 138 (193 ).
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by the purchaser. This is because it is broad enough to cover a multitude
of defects. The words, as set out in the statute, which give rise to the
covenant of warranty are as follows: " .- .and the said party of the first
part does hereby fully warrant the title to said land, and will defend the
same against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever. ' 30  Statutes in
derogation of the common law are often given a strict construction. For
this reason, the Florida Supreme Court has held that failure to use the
word "fully" in the statutory form renders the deed void of any covenants
except those expressed.3 ' In a case where the grantor warranted title
against " . . . claims of all persons whomsoever, by, through and under
him .... ", it was held that the additional words "by, through and under
him" made the effect of the deed to be in special warranty only.a2 Therefore,
it must be stressed that a buyer should be careful to follow the language of
the statute if he wants to receive the full covenants with the covenant of
warranty. It can be said of the covenant of warranty (as of the covenants of
seisin and against incumbrances) that it will estop the grantor from denying
the intended effect of the deed.33 The covenant of warranty will not pass
by estoppel an estate greater than that which was expressly conveyed.34 If a
deed of conveyance puts a limitation on the covenant of warranty, by a
conveyance subject to a mortgage, for example, it does not put a prudent
purchaser on inquiry as to an unrecorded mortgage."3 Therefore, the vendee
has a cause of action where an unrecorded mortgage exists. Similarly, if a
purchaser has knowledge of an existing mortgage and accepts a warranty
deed, lie can expect that the existing mortgage will be paid out of the down
payment, or that the amount of the original mortgage will be deducted
from the purchase price.36 It has been said that the measure of damages for
breach of warranty is generally the same as that for breach of the covenant
of seisin.37 Yet, in a case where the vendor resold the property after selling
it to the covenantee, the court held that the recovery should be for the dam-
ages resulting from the loss of the bargain.38  The court reasoned that the
situation was the same as if the covenantor had good title and refused to
convey. It was not a breach of warranty where a vendor failed to pay off
a lien for street improvements imposed after the sale price was agreed
upon.3  Finally, in a small group of cases involving purchase money mort-
gages, the court has steadfastly held that if the mortgagor remains in un-
disputed possession under a deed warranting his title, and no eviction or
30. FLA. STAT. § 689.02 (1951).
31. Van Ness v. Royal Phosphate Co., 60 Fla. 284, 53 So. 381 (1910).
32. Burton v. Price, 105 Fla. 544, 141 So. 728 (1932).
33. Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (1927).
34. Ibid.
35. Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939).
36. Coleman v. Johnson, 136 Fla. 609, 187 So. 263 (1939).
37. Calder v. Richardson, 11 F.Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1935).
38. Eaton v. Hopkins, 71 Fla. 615, 71 So. 922 (1916).
39. Charbonier v. Arbona, 68 Fla. 194, 67 So. 41 (1914).
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fraud on the part of the vendor is shown, lie cannot set up an outstanding
title or breach of warranty as a defense to a foreclosure, but has his remedy
at law on the broken covenant.4 0
One of the most important ways in which all the covenants for title
protect the buyer is that parol evidence in derogation of the covenant is
not admissible. This is best illustrated by a case which held that a breach
of the covenant against incumbrances cannot be overcome by parol evidence
alleging an assumption of tax liens by the vcndee.'
Having discussed the Florida case law on the covenants for title, two
questions remain unanswered. 'The first is concerned with the status of the
covenant for further assurances. The second question is in regard to the
position the Florida Supreme Court will take when it is confronted with
the problem of deciding whether the covenants of seisin and against incum-
brances run with the land.
The covenant for further assurances is not in common use in the
United States, but it is, nevertheless, one of the six common law covenants.
As such, it would seem to fall within the "full common law covenants" of
the Florida statute.42 There has been no Florida case based on this covenant,
as yet, nor has there been a Florida case setting out what the common law
covenants are. Oddly enough, the only case that did state the common law
covenants in common use in Florida was a case in the Federal court.43  This
case did not mention the covenant for further assurances. I-low the Supreme
Court of Florida will react to an action for breach of the covenant for fur-
ther assurances, based on the statutory warranty deed is a moot question.
It seems that recognition of this covenant would afford additional protection
to the purchaser, and for this reason, would be desirable.
The recording statute affords protection to subsequent purchasers or
creditors in Florida: 4 The question is whether or not the covenants for
title afford any protection to remote purchasers. The answer may evolve
from a discussion of covenants for title running with the land. "It is a
settled rule on both sides of the Atlantic that until breach, the covenants for
title, without distinction between them, run with the land to heirs and
assigns." 45 In the United States the majority view is that the covenants for
title are of two distinct types-those in futuro and those in praesenti.46 It is
said that the covenant of seisin, the covenant of right to convey, and the
covenant against incumbranes arc all in praesenti, and therefore are broken
40. Knapp v. Fredricksen, 146 Fla. 239, 1 So.2d 181 (1941); R. J. & B. F. Camp
Lumber Co. v. State Savings Bank, 59 Fla. 455, 51 So. 543 (1910); Adams v. Fry, 29
Fla. 318, 10 So. 559 (1892); Randall v. Bourquardez, 23 Fla. 264, 2 So. 310 (1887).
41. Bond v. Hewitt, 111 Fla. 180, 149 So. 606 (1933).
42. See note 13, supra.
43. Coral Gables Inc., v. Payne, 94 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1938).
44. See Comment, 6 NIAMi L.Q. 595 (1952).
45. RAWLE, TuE LAw OF COVENANTS FOR 'TITLE, 336 (3d ed. 1860).
46. Ibid.
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immediately upon execution and delivery of the dcced.4 Continuing along
this line of reasoning, all that remains is a cause of action personal to the
grantee. Therefore, these covenants do not run with the land. "On the
other hand, it is held in England that no such distinction exists between
the different covenants. That for seizin, it has been said, is not like a
covenant to do an act of solitary performance, which not being done, the
covenant is broken once for all, but it is rather in the nature of a covenant to
do a thing toties quoties as the exigencies of the case may require, and that
the want of seizin is therefore a continuing breach."48
This is the view followed by some of our American courtsj 9 even though
they admit along with the other courts that these covenants are broken im-
mediately upon delivery. In Florida it is not known which rule will be fol-
lowed. Although it has been decided that the covenants of seisin and
against incumnbrances are broken immediately upon delivery,50 the court
has not taken a position as to whether these covenants run with the land.
The import of a decision on this point is illustrated by the following hypo-
thetical situation. Suppose that A conveys to B by warranty deed, and B
conveys to C in similar fashion, but then C conveys to D by quitclaim deed.
In the event the land is incumbered, what right does D have against A or
B? If the covenant of incumbrance runs with the land, then D has an
action against either A or B who covenanted against incumbrances. On the
other hand, if the covenant of incumbrances is broken immediately upon
delivery of the deed and all that remains is a personal cause of action in
the grantee, then D is left without a remedy.
Until the doubts concerning the covenant for further assurances and
the question of whether the covenants of seisin and against incumbrances
run with the land are resolved, we can only say this much about the cove-
nants for title in Florida and the protection they give to the buyer. As be-
tween the grantor and the covenantee, the use of the statutory form'of
warranty deed will give rise to at least five covenants. These are the cove-
nants of seisin, of right to convey, against incumbrances, for quiet enjoy-
inent, and of warranty. The breach of these covenants leaves the covenantee
with a right of action in law for damages, and the theory of damages is
compensatory. In the absence of fraud, use of the courts of equity to obtain
relief has been denied.5 ' A buyer in Florida can rest assured that he need
accept nothing more than the statutory warranty deed to receive the same
protection that he might have in any other state.
LEONARDO SPITALE
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 337.
49. Brinton v. Johnson, 35 Idaho 667, 298 Pac. 1028 (1922); Anderson v. Larson,
177 Minn. 606, 225 N.W. 902 (1929); Talbert v. Grist. 198 Mo. App. 482, 201 S.W
906 (1918); Geiszler v. DeFraaf, 166 N.Y. 339, 59 N.E. 993 (1901).
50. Supra, note 27.
51. Supra, note 20.
